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Executive summary 
In April 2001, the government announced a consultation on ‘policies designed to 
increase rates of saving and asset-ownership, both among the lower-income households 
of today, and in generations of families to come’. Two reforms were discussed and the 
2001 Labour Party election manifesto has committed the government to introduce both 
in the current parliament. The policies are:  
1.  A Child Trust Fund, which is a lump-sum payment made for every child at birth. 
Children from lower-income families will receive a larger payment and the funds will 
be locked away until adulthood. 
2.  A Saving Gateway, which is a savings account for those on lower incomes. The 
government will match individuals’ contributions in order to provide an incentive for 
account holders to place funds in these accounts. 
To justify these policies, the government has focused on the benefits to individuals of a 
‘saving habit’ and of holding financial assets. It has pointed to the fact that ‘people 
without assets are much more likely to have lower earnings and higher unemployment, 
and are less likely to start a business or enter higher education’. While it may be true that 
individuals who are able to plan ahead and save are more likely subsequently to 
experience better outcomes, it does not necessarily follow that providing assets or 
financial incentives to save is the best way to help individuals who are not currently 
saving. An alternative would be to provide low-income individuals with greater incomes 
and allow them to decide how much to consume today and how much to save for 
consumption in the future. 
That is not to say that all individuals are necessarily making optimal saving decisions and 
that there is no justification for government intervention. There is evidence from the 
USA that the provision of financial education can increase individuals’ rates of saving. 
Given the likely cost of the Child Trust Fund and the Saving Gateway, it should be 
considered whether extensions in the provision of financial education would represent a 
better-value alternative. If it is believed that individuals will only learn from financial 
education if they are currently holding a financial asset, then it is possible that the Saving 
Gateway will lead to some individuals making better decisions. 
The government’s consultation document lacks clarity in discussing the specific aims of 
the Child Trust Fund. One justification is that ‘all young people should be able to 
embark on their adult lives with a financial asset to invest in their future’. If this is the 
sole purpose, then a more obvious policy would be to give financial assets to young 
adults rather than to children at birth. Targeting resources on the basis of family income 
at birth, or teaching children about finances and the benefits of forward planning, are 
possible arguments for providing the asset at a younger age. If these benefits apply to 
newborns, it seems strange to believe that they would not also be felt by other young 
children who would not be helped by the policy as currently proposed. The lack of clarity 
regarding the specific policy objectives and how these relate to the policy design make it 
hard to discuss important issues such as whether the choice of how matured funds can 
be spent should be restricted to uses such as funding education. If the aim of the policy 2 
is to improve opportunities for higher education among lower-income groups, then a 
better-focused reform is likely to be the reintroduction of maintenance grants. The 
provision by the government of a clearer set of aims would be beneficial in enabling 
necessary further consultation to consider many detailed design issues. 
A central aim of the Saving Gateway is to ‘increase rates of saving and asset-ownership’ 
among lower-income households. One potential problem with targeting the Saving 
Gateway on the basis of income alone is that many individuals who are already making 
sensible saving decisions would be eligible for an account. Evidence from the British 
Household Panel Survey shows that, were a Saving Gateway to be targeted solely on the 
poorest fifth of the population, then less than a third of this group look like individuals 
who do not have an obvious reason for not saving. Those remaining have already been 
able to save more than £500, or are retired, unemployed or in full-time education. These 
individuals are unlikely to benefit fully from the policy in the ways that the government 
hopes. This might also apply to those who live in owner-occupied housing or who are 
making savings in the form of a pension. Excluding these groups leaves just one-in-eight 
of the poorest fifth of the population. 
Among those eligible for the Saving Gateway, those who already have financial assets 
will be able to benefit financially from the government match simply by switching their 
savings into the new account. This could make the policy very costly. The government 
should consider whether a small-scale Saving Gateway targeted at those who are more 
likely to benefit from the scheme should be introduced. One possible target group would 
be those who have just moved into paid employment, since it might be a good time for 
them to reappraise their saving decisions. Such a scheme could be evaluated in order to 
assess the size of any beneficial effects and, in the light of this evidence, could be 
extended to other groups, left unchanged or abolished without creating many losers. 
Further consultation on these details would be of use if the government wants to ensure 
that the policy delivers as many benefits as possible for the minimum exchequer cost.  
The government has claimed that ‘the right environment for saving involves a stable 
macroeconomy’. The microeconomic stability provided by a stable and simple savings 
environment would also help individuals to make appropriate saving decisions. New 
reforms proposed by the government come at the cost of complexity and uncertainty. 
Individuals, such as those in the stakeholder pension target group, may want to re-
evaluate whether they should be saving in a pension scheme, since, if they save in a liquid 
form and become eligible for a Saving Gateway, then these savings might receive a 
government match. With the Child Trust Fund, the government has a manifesto pledge 
to ‘provide incentives for extended family and friends as well as parents to contribute’. 
The consultation document suggests Individual Savings Account (ISA)-style tax relief. 
The main beneficiaries of this would be those who contribute up to the annual ISA limit. 
If the government decides to provide a more generous incentive than this, it would 
severely reduce the attractiveness of saving in an ISA for families with children. 
Issues of targeting and interactions with other savings instruments are crucial to the 
design of the Child Trust Fund and the Saving Gateway. The provision by the 
government of a clearer set of aims for these policies would help to enable further 
consultation to be of maximum benefit to the reform process.  3 
1. Introduction 
When it was elected to government in 1997, the Labour Party promised reforms to 
‘promote saving’ (Labour Party, 1997). The introduction of Individual Savings Accounts 
(ISAs) and stakeholder pensions can be seen as reforms intended, at least in part, to 
further this aim. The 2001 election manifesto committed the government to endeavour 
to ‘boost the savings habit’ (Labour Party, 2001, p. 10) amongst individuals.  
The latest announced policies intended to further this aim are proposals to introduce a 
new ‘Saving Gateway’ and ‘Child Trust Fund’ (HM Treasury, 2001a). These represent 
something of a new departure in terms of the means by which they will affect incentives 
to save and hold assets. Stakeholder pensions give people a positive incentive to lock up 
some savings until retirement. ISAs are intended to ensure that taxpayers do not have a 
disincentive to save some of their current income in a more liquid form.1 In contrast, the 
Saving Gateway will provide those from lower-income households with a strong financial 
incentive to save in a relatively liquid form. The Child Trust Fund will simply present a 
financial asset to children which can be spent when they reach adulthood. 
In this Commentary, we consider some potential arguments for the introduction of these 
new policies and discuss certain issues that might be important in deciding the details of 
how the policies are designed. Chapter 2 examines what exactly we mean by the term 
‘asset-based welfare’ and leads into the discussion of potential rationales for introducing 
asset-based policies that is contained in Chapter 3. Having looked at what the aims of the 
policies might be, we are in a position to consider what the best design for the policies 
would be if these aims are to be achieved. Chapter 4 begins the process of discussing this 
issue by describing what we already know about the form that the policies will take and 
what remains to be decided. Chapter 5 provides analysis of some issues that will be 
important in determining how the policies should be designed, how much they might 
cost and which groups might benefit. Chapter 6 concludes. 
                                                      
1 The dividend tax credit does provide an incentive to save in UK equities held in an ISA, over and above smoothing-
out of tax disincentives. 4 
2.  What is asset-based welfare? 
Since the term was first coined 10 years ago (Sherraden, 1991), it has become relatively 
common in policy debate in the USA to discuss ‘asset-based’ policy. ‘Asset-based’ 
policies are now also being discussed in other countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
Singapore and Sweden. Following proposals to introduce a Child Trust Fund and a 
Saving Gateway in the UK, the term is now also gaining currency in policy discussions 
here. Before considering the details of the policy debate in the UK, it is helpful to 
consider what is new about an ‘asset-based’ approach and what the rationale for 
employing it might be. We begin this task in this chapter with a discussion of what we 
mean by the term ‘asset-based welfare’ in the UK context. 
Broadly speaking, asset-based policies are all public policies that involve encouraging or 
forcing individuals to hold assets. Typically, the assets will be financial, although the 
policies might be intended as part of a strategy to encourage people to invest in assets 
such as education, a home or their own business. Under this broad definition, a move 
from a state-financed pay-as-you-go pension system to a funded system with individual 
accounts might be seen as an asset-based policy. In Sweden, the option of using personal 
savings accounts has been discussed as a means of organising a wide range of social 
insurance systems, including adult education, unemployment insurance, support for 
families and health insurance (see Fölster in Regan and Paxton (2001)). 
In the UK (and in most other countries), the term has been used to describe a much 
narrower range of policies than this. The policies involved are intended ‘to increase rates 
of saving and asset-ownership, both among the lower-income households of today, and 
in generations of families to come’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, abstract). What the Child Trust 
Fund and the Saving Gateway have in common is that they both provide financial 
assistance, targeted towards lower-income households, in the form of assets. This is in 
contrast to the standard approach of providing welfare benefits in the form of income 
supplements. The fact that the assistance is targeted towards lower-income households 
perhaps also explains why these asset-based policies are sometimes described as asset-
based welfare policies. 
The government does not see asset-based welfare as a new way of organising large parts 
of the Welfare State. Rather, it is seen as an additional, ‘complementary, strand of welfare 
policy’ (HM Treasury, 2001a). Nonetheless, the proponent of these policies needs to 
explain why some of the financial support that is directed towards lower-income families 
is better provided in the form of assets rather than income. Providing individuals and 
families with greater income allows them to decide how much of it to consume and how 
much to save. Providing the same groups with assets may not help them have higher 
consumption today, while providing them with strong incentives to save may actually 
reduce their consumption in the current period. A justification of the policies must 
explain why it is good to constrain or distort the choices that these groups make 
concerning how they use their resources. Income supplements are also relatively easily 
targeted at those on low incomes, which is not necessarily the case with the targeting of 
asset-based policies since many lower-income individuals may be only temporarily poor. 
We consider some potential rationales for an asset-based approach in the next chapter. 5 
3.  Why might we want to have asset-based welfare? 
A sound rationale for asset-based welfare must show that there is more value in 
providing financial assistance to families in the form of assets than there is in spending 
the same amount on transfer payments, such as the integrated child credit and the 
employment tax credit, or on improving public services or cutting taxes.2 In this chapter, 
we consider several economic arguments that might favour the asset-based approach, 
and discuss whether or not they are likely to be sufficient to justify some form of asset-
based policy. This consideration of the best justifications for the policies is interesting in 
itself, and it will also help to focus our subsequent discussions of whether or not the 
government’s proposed policies can achieve their likely aims.  
3.1  A desire to redistribute wealth? 
A desire to influence the overall wealth distribution? 
One potential outcome of asset-based welfare is that it achieves a more even distribution 
of wealth, which in itself could be seen as a justification. Banks and Tanner (1999), using 
data from the NOP Financial Resources Survey for individuals in 1997–98, show that, 
due to the uneven distribution of financial wealth, mean wealth of £7,136 was almost 10 
times larger than the median holding of just £750. In contrast, mean financial wealth 
among the wealthiest 10 per cent of the population was found to be in excess of 
£50,000. Research by Banks, Blundell and Smith (2000) uses data from the British 
Household Panel Survey to look at household rather than individual wealth, and includes 
tangible assets such as houses and cars alongside financial wealth. Using this research, 
Goodman (2001) shows that, to be in the wealthiest 10 per cent of the population, a 
household needs wealth of almost £170,000, compared with median household wealth of 
just over £36,000, as shown in Figure 3.1. It should be noted that this measure of wealth 
excludes occupational, personal and state pension wealth, which is often an individual’s 
largest asset. 
Further evidence on the distribution of wealth is provided by Inland Revenue statistics 
from data on inheritance tax returns. These state that, in 1998, the wealthiest 10 per cent 
of individuals held more than half of total wealth, as shown in Figure 3.2. This graph also 
shows how the concentration of personal wealth has changed between 1976 and 1998. 
Wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, changed very little over the period 
from 1976 to 1995, although there is some evidence that inequality has increased in the 
last few years of data. For example, the Gini coefficient has increased from 0.65 in 1995 
to 0.69 in 1997 and 1998. It should be remembered that changes in these aggregate 
figures could reflect a range of factors that are not necessarily related to why we might 
care about the distribution of wealth. For example, changes in birth rates in the past will 
lead to changes in the proportion of individuals who, at any one time, are just before 
retirement. Since this is the point in the life cycle when individuals might be expected to  
 
                                                      
2 One argument for providing people with assets is that they may be able to obtain rates of return from investing in 
equities that are greater than the rate of return at which the government borrows. The government has not made this 
argument. In any case, arguments of this type are complicated by a number of issues – for a discussion in the context 
of pensions policy, see, for example, Appendix A of Clark and Dilnot (2001). 6 
Figure 3.1. Distribution of wealth in Great Britain 
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in January 2001 prices. 
Source: Goodman (2001) using research by Banks, Blundell and Smith (2000). 
 
Figure 3.2. Concentration of personal wealth in the UK 
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 7 
hold the most wealth, changes in the proportion near retirement will affect aggregate 
measures of the concentration of wealth. 
These Inland Revenue figures suggest that, in 1998, total personal wealth was 
£2,543 billion, which is almost exactly three times the UK’s total national income in that 
year. Even though this wealth is very unevenly distributed, this does not justify 
government intervention in the form of asset-based welfare. This is because it is apparent 
that even a relatively large asset-based welfare package would be unlikely to have much 
effect on the distribution of wealth in the short and medium terms. Any reform package 
wishing to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth in the short or medium term 
would probably need to consider other policies, such as reforms to inheritance tax and 
the possibility of a capital transfer tax. 
A desire to influence the wealth distribution among certain groups? 
The government has not, so far, used arguments about the overall distribution of wealth 
to justify asset-based welfare. One aim that it has suggested is ‘promoting inter-
generational mobility – extending to the children of lower-income families the 
opportunities that might be taken for granted higher up the income ladder’ (HM 
Treasury, 2001a, para. 1.5). Evidence on UK intergenerational mobility from Dearden, 
Machin and Reed (1997), using data from the National Child Development Survey, 
shows that there is a clear correlation between the earnings of a father and the 
subsequent earnings of their children. For example, of the sons whose fathers were in the 
bottom earnings quartile, only 12.8 per cent were in the top earnings quartile. Even less 
downwards mobility from the top earnings quartile was found. 
It is possible to imagine targeted reform packages that could influence the distribution of 
wealth among young adults quite significantly – for example, mean financial wealth 
among 22- to 29-year-olds in 1997–98 was £1,746 (Banks and Tanner, 1999, p. 72), with 
levels of financial wealth among younger adults likely to be even lower. A policy giving 
assets to individuals in young adulthood is likely to reduce wealth inequality at that point, 
and, at the very least, will increase asset holding among low-wealth individuals. If it is the 
case that access to a stock of assets among young adults is one of the transmission 
mechanisms of intergenerational mobility, then asset-based welfare packages that 
provided assets to young adults could increase intergenerational mobility. This could 
potentially benefit the economy as a whole, as talented individuals became less 
constrained by their childhood family circumstances. Policies that did lead to an increase 
in intergenerational mobility could, in the long run, reduce overall wealth inequality. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that asset-based welfare packages are the best way 
to promote intergenerational mobility. An alternative policy would be to improve the 
education opportunities for children from lower-income families through increases in 
education spending focused specifically at these groups. 
3.2  Other potential justifications for asset-based welfare? 
The government has argued that asset holding has many beneficial effects on an 
individual’s life and that government intervention can work effectively to spread these 
benefits more widely. This section looks at evidence on how many people are not 8 
holding any financial assets, before addressing several possible arguments for asset-based 
welfare in turn.  
Evidence on asset holding is provided by the annual Family Resources Survey (FRS) 
from 1995–96 to 1999–2000.3 On average across the five years of data, 10.8 per cent of 
families are found not to hold any form of financial asset, including a current account. 
Those with no financial assets are, unsurprisingly, found to be more concentrated 
towards the lower end of the income distribution. Nearly one in four of those in the 
bottom income decile do not report having any financial assets, compared with one in 10 
of those in the fifth decile and less than 1 per cent of those in the richest 10 per cent of 
the population. There is some evidence in Figure 3.3 that, over the five years covered by 
the FRS, there has been a slight fall in the proportion with no financial assets.  
Figure 3.3. Proportion of families with no financial assets, by income and year 
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Over the longer run, evidence from Banks and Tanner (1999) using the Family 
Expenditure Survey shows that the proportion of households reporting to have no 
financial assets and no housing wealth was 4.7 per cent at the beginning of the 1980s and 
reached 10.2 per cent in 1996. This increase was particularly large amongst those 
households with a head aged under 35. It must, though, be noted that the decision of 
whether or not to hold assets is a complicated one and individuals may have good 
reasons to choose not to hold interest-bearing assets. As stressed by Kempson and 
                                                      
3 For further details of asset holding from the 1998–99 FRS, see Section 2 of HM Treasury (2000). 9 
Whyley (1999), many of those who do not possess a financial asset at any particular 
moment will have done so in the past and may do so again in the future. 
We now turn to assess arguments that suggest that an asset-based approach to welfare 
might be beneficial to those individuals who have little or no savings. These arguments 
include the fact that access to financial assets may improve an individual’s opportunities 
to study or start a business, whether holding financial assets leads to other beneficial 
effects on an individual’s well-being, such as their subsequent health or employment 
prospects, and whether there is evidence that some individuals are simply not saving 
enough. In addition to these possible factors, we consider whether any other government 
interventions are likely to offer better value for money than support through a package 
of asset-based welfare. 
Individuals are prevented from borrowing to purchase certain goods? 
Under normal circumstances, individuals would be expected to purchase a good or make 
an investment if the expected benefits outweighed the expected costs. In the absence of 
any market failures, governments could simply allow these transactions to take place and 
concentrate on achieving their distributional objectives. One argument that has been 
used to justify asset-based welfare is that people on low incomes find it difficult to obtain 
credit and often can only borrow at high rates of interest. One problem with this 
argument is that it might be the case that the higher rates of interest are justifiable on the 
basis that these individuals have higher risk of default. There are, however, two types of 
activity that individuals may have difficulty financing due to identifiable market failures: 
education and self-employment. We assess each of these in turn. 
Education 
Individuals may be unable to borrow in order to undertake education because they might 
not be able to use any increased earnings potential as collateral. This does not necessarily 
imply that asset-based welfare would be the best policy, since it will also go to individuals 
who do not wish to undertake education. In 2001–02, the government is planning to 
spend £47.7 billion on education (HM Treasury, 2001b). If the government wants to 
improve education outcomes further, then a better use of any increased expenditure may 
be to increase this amount rather than to opt for some form of asset-based welfare. 
These additional funds could be targeted at individuals living in deprived areas, perhaps 
along the lines of the government’s ‘Sure Start’ or ‘Excellence in Cities’ initiatives. An 
alternative policy also focused towards those on lower incomes would be to provide 
support with living costs for those in further and higher education. The government is 
also currently piloting the education maintenance allowance (EMA), which is a means-
tested payment to those deciding to remain in full-time education between 16 and 18. 
Early evidence suggests that this is increasing participation in further education among 
low-income groups (Ashworth et al., 2001). The government has also stated that ‘Our 
aim is to get more children from less privileged backgrounds into higher education and 
we hope to better achieve this by changing the combination of family, student and state 10 
contributions’.4 Subsidising the maintenance costs of young adults from lower-income 
families seems a much-better-targeted policy for increasing their participation rates in 
higher education than any package of asset-based welfare. 
Self-employment 
Individuals trying to borrow money in order to finance a business venture may find it 
particularly difficult to raise capital if they lack any collateral of their own. Normally, the 
market response to an excess of demand over supply is for prices to rise – in the case of 
the demand for loans, this would lead to an increase in the rate of interest charged by the 
lender. There are economic models that suggest that financial institutions may decide not 
to increase interest rates, but instead to ration credit and, in particular, to insist on 
individuals putting financial collateral of their own into any new venture (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981).5 This is supported, for example, by evidence from the National Child 
Development Study showing that individuals who have received an inheritance are more 
likely to become self-employed (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).6 While this is a 
genuine market failure, it is difficult to think of a well-targeted government intervention 
that will lead to a better allocation of resources. Asset-based welfare packages are likely 
to be poorly targeted since they will be received by many individuals who would not have 
applied for finance to start a business. Many applications for loans that are rejected by 
banks will be rejected on the grounds that the project does not appear to be 
economically viable – obvious reasons include the applicant not being considered to have 
the appropriate skills or experience. This is particularly likely to be the case with young 
adults. 
Holding assets improves people’s life chances? 
In order to support the claim that asset-based welfare will help those on lower incomes 
by more than simply spending equivalent amounts on further increases in benefits such 
as income support, the integrated child credit and the minimum income guarantee, the 
government has argued that holding assets has an ‘independent effect on individuals’ life 
chances and attitudes, above and beyond such factors as their social class background or 
educational achievement’.7 This is similar to the case made by Sherraden (1991), who 
argued that having assets and engaging in the process of saving could be associated with 
a range of beneficial effects, including household stability, risk taking, participation in 
education and improved health. The relationship between having assets and outcomes 
was stressed in the government’s election manifesto, which stated that ‘people without 
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mediamonitor/DisplayRB.cgi?pn_id=0128). 
5 This is because the lender is unable to assess perfectly either the proposed venture or the subsequent effort of the 
person borrowing the money. Increasing interest rates might simply lead to only individuals with relatively riskier 
projects approaching the lender for finance. The solution is to increase the amount of monitoring of projects and to 
increase risk sharing by insisting that the borrower also puts some collateral into the venture. 
6 Although, as stated by the authors, it is possible that ‘perhaps wealth makes people less risk-averse and thus more 
prone to go into business, or self-employment allows wealthier individuals to consume leisure more easily’. 
7 Speech by David Blunkett, then Secretary of State for Education, to the Institute for Public Policy Research, 7 June 
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assets are much more likely to have lower earnings and higher unemployment, and are 
less likely to start a business or enter higher education’ (Labour Party, 2001, p. 27). 
Evidence from the UK on these beneficial effects has been cited by the Treasury as a 
potential justification for asset-based welfare.8 This comes from a study by Bynner and 
Despotidou (2001) that uses data from the National Child Development Survey (NCDS). 
This survey contains information on over 12,000 people who were born in March 1958 
and were interviewed at various ages in their life. The study looks at the correlation of 
having savings, holding investments and receiving inheritances at age 23 with various 
outcomes at age 33, once other background characteristics have been controlled for. 
In the NCDS data, 82 per cent of the sample reported having savings, 11 per cent having 
an investment and 12 per cent receiving a gift or an inheritance worth more than £500. 
Table 3.1 gives the results for a selection of the outcome variables that were analysed. 
For example, it shows that, for men, holding savings at age 23 was positively correlated 
with years in full-time employment between 23 and 33 and with general health at age 33. 
The significant correlations reported in the table are all found to be robust to adding 
numerous background variables, including whether the individual owns a house between 
the ages of 23 and 33 and what the individual earns at age 33. While a number of 
significant correlations were found between having savings and subsequent outcomes, 
very few were found between holding investments and subsequent outcomes. This is 
potentially of concern, given that an extremely high proportion (82 per cent) of the 23-
year-olds in the sample reported having savings, making it unclear whether they were 
actually saving in an active way or if, for example, they simply had a small amount of 
money in a current account. Rather than interpreting the findings as saying that having 
savings at age 23 improves subsequent outcomes, we might prefer to say that those who 
were likely to be without any savings account at age 23 were also those who were more 
likely to experience ‘bad’ life outcomes subsequently. 
Table 3.1. Correlation of having savings and investments at age 23 
with various outcomes at age 33a 
Men Women   
Savings Investments Savings Investments 
Labour market experience 
between 23 and 33: 
    
Years in education  ns  ns  –  ns 
Years in full-time employment  +  ns  ns  ns 
Years spent unemployed  –  –  –  ns 
Marital breakdown  –  ns  –  ns 
Smoking –  ns  –  ns 
General  health  + ns ns ns 
a + denotes a positive and significant correlation, – a negative and significant correlation and ns no 
significant correlation. Other correlations – for example, years spent in self-employment, individuals’ 
attitudes and potential indicators of parenting ability – are also contained in the study. 
Source: Bynner and Despotidou, 2001. 
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As the authors themselves acknowledge, ‘placing causal interpretations on statistical 
relationships in non-experimental data of the kind reported here is always problematic. It 
is possible that another control variable could be found that would eliminate the 
observed effects of assets’. With this particular study, the concern is that holding savings 
at age 23 is correlated with something else that has an effect on the outcomes that are 
observed at age 33 but that has not been adequately controlled for. The most obvious 
factor would be that individuals who save are those who are more able and/or willing to 
plan ahead, which is also likely to affect many other outcomes.  
If the correlations observed in this study are causal as opposed to reflecting other 
unobserved factors, the true cause is still not clear. It could be either that individuals who 
have had a financial asset are also more likely to experience a ‘good’ life event 
subsequently, or that it is individuals who have gone through the process of saving who 
are also more likely to experience a ‘good’ outcome. The process of saving would be the 
important factor if it were individuals’ ability to constrain consumption and plan ahead, 
rather than the holding of a financial asset per se, that mattered for subsequent life 
outcomes (Paxton, 2001). The government has stated the aim of not only getting more 
people to hold financial assets but also to ‘extend the savings habit to more people’ 
(Labour Party, 2001, p. 27). If it is this ‘savings habit’ that leads to the good subsequent 
outcomes observed by Bynner and Despotidou, then certain forms of asset-based welfare 
policies, such as those that provide individuals with a financial asset without making 
them save out of current income, are unlikely to deliver all the benefits that their 
proponents hope.  
One possible way of seeing whether simply giving individuals assets, without also making 
them engage in the process of saving, had any beneficial effects on their subsequent 
outcomes would be to look at the impact of the receipt of inheritances. This might be 
better at demonstrating the effect of holding an asset rather than the effect of an 
individual being able to plan ahead and constrain their consumption.9 In fact, Bynner and 
Despotidou (2001) also looked at the effect of inheritances, but this ‘showed barely any 
effects so was dropped from the later stages of the analysis’. 
Even if the correlations found in the NCDS are causal, this does not necessarily imply 
that providing an asset to individuals who did not save would improve their outcomes at 
age 33 in the same way, since individuals who chose not to hold savings at age 23 may be 
affected differently by holding an asset from those who did choose to save. Furthermore, 
the Bynner and Despotidou study only looks at the impact of asset holding on 
subsequent outcomes for one group of individuals at one point in time. Any relationships 
found could well change over time, due, for example, to the increase in numbers 
participating in further and higher education. In any case, if the objective of asset-based 
welfare is to improve, for example, subsequent employment or health outcomes, then it 
also needs to be shown that increasing public spending on asset-based welfare is better 
than alternative policies aimed at improving work incentives or improving the quality of 
health or education services. 
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Some people are not saving enough? 
An alternative, paternalistic, justification for asset-based welfare is a possible concern that 
some individuals are not currently saving enough. As shown at the beginning of this 
section, there are large numbers of people who do not have any financial assets. It is 
important to be clear about why people might not be saving ‘enough’, since there may be 
perfectly sensible reasons why individuals are currently consuming most of, all or more 
than their current income. 
Even if there is evidence of people not saving enough, it is also important to determine 
what the most effective policy response is. For example, the government cites the fact 
that assets can act as a ‘cushion for families if they are hit by unemployment or other 
unexpected adversity’.10 It has also been argued that there are new challenges for welfare 
policy from the fact that there have been changes in the risks that individuals face and 
also in life-cycle patterns (see Latham in Regan and Paxton (2001) and Paxton in Regan 
(2001)). Even so, it is still the case that a better-targeted policy might involve improving 
the standard of living provided by the social security safety net. One possible argument 
against this is that there are advantages to an individual from being self-reliant and not 
becoming financially dependent on state benefits. While this may be important, it is also 
true that it is welfare-improving for individuals to be able to insure against certain 
contingencies rather than bearing the risks themselves. Since certain events, such as job 
loss, may be uninsurable through private markets, large welfare gains from social 
insurance may be possible. These gains come from the fact that the risk of 
unemployment is then pooled across many families in a similar way to when individuals 
purchase private insurance of any other kind, such as against car theft. 
While it is clear that there are large numbers of individuals who have no, or very small 
amounts of, savings, this alone is not sufficient to justify a role for asset-based welfare, 
since they may still be making sensible saving decisions. Those who are permanently on 
low incomes may find that they have little opportunity to build up any savings since this 
would require them to reduce their current consumption to a level below their current 
low income. The obvious example of someone in this situation would be a pensioner 
currently receiving the minimum income guarantee – there may be little for them to gain 
from holding any savings, especially since the government has already pledged that their 
income, over this parliament at least, will rise in line with earnings (Labour Party, 2001). 
Those who are only temporarily on a low income would be expected to be using part of 
any savings to finance their consumption needs. These individuals could also quite 
rationally decide to spend all of their savings and even build up debts if they felt that it 
was likely that their income would rise in the future. It is also not clear whether these 
individuals would be better off if the government decided to use an asset-based approach 
to welfare or simply decided to increase benefits that are payable to groups on low 
incomes. 
There are quite plausible scenarios under which individuals are making non-rational 
savings decisions that could be corrected through some kind of government intervention. 
The appropriate design of any asset-based welfare package will depend on what the 
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reasons for individuals not saving enough are believed to be. Two possible related 
arguments are that: 
1.  individuals who do not have financial assets have insufficient knowledge of financial 
institutions and products; and 
2.  individuals have not got into the habit of either holding financial assets or consuming 
less than their current income.  
Each of these possibilities provides a rationale for some form of government 
intervention. The first suggests that asset-based welfare could help, since individuals who 
are provided with an asset or a strong incentive to hold an asset may then obtain 
information that leads them to revise their saving patterns. If an individual is provided 
with one financial asset, they may then become more familiar with financial 
intermediaries and learn about the potential benefits involved in holding more financial 
assets. Similarly, if individuals are currently in a habit of not saving, then some form of 
time-limited incentive could be sufficient to get them into a habit of saving, which might 
improve their welfare for a longer period of time.11  
These types of arguments suggest that financial education could be extremely important 
in helping individuals who are not saving enough. There is evidence from the USA that 
the provision of financial education increases individuals’ saving rates. The provision of 
financial education through schools has been found to have a positive effect on 
individuals’ subsequent saving rates (Bernheim, Garrett and Maki, 2001). Financial 
education provided through the workplace, in the form of frequent seminars, has been 
found to increase individuals’ contribution rates to private pension plans (Bayer, 
Bernheim and Scholz, 1996; Bernheim and Garrett, 1996). There have also been 
experiments with Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) in the USA which suggest 
that moderate amounts of financial education (six to 12 hours) increase the amount that 
participants in the programme save (Schreiner et al., 2001).  
There are still some concerns that asset-based welfare may not be the right policy 
intervention. If individuals have not got into the habit of saving, then whether or not a 
particular form of asset-based welfare will work depends on precisely how these habits 
operate. Giving an individual a strong incentive to save for a short period of time may 
not be sufficient to get them into a long-term habit of reducing their consumption 
relative to their income. If individuals lack information about financial products, then it 
might be the case that a better-value-for-money policy intervention would be to provide 
more financial education instead of, rather than alongside, any asset-based welfare. 
However, it may be the case that asset-based welfare is needed to ensure that individuals 
get the most out of financial education. For example, it is possible that individuals will 
only be able to benefit fully from financial information if they are actually holding a 
financial asset. This would be true if individuals holding financial assets found that 
financial education was more relevant to them and if they were able to ‘practise’ that 
education at the time that they received it. Furthermore, in the USA, it has been 
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suggested that ‘although match money may provide the necessary incentive to attract 
participants to the program, the financial literacy and asset-specific training classes may 
have the greatest impact on participant decision-making’ (Abt Associates Inc., 2000).  
3.3  Which arguments come closest to justifying some form of asset-based 
welfare? 
We have considered a number of possible justifications for asset-based welfare. Those 
based on a desire to influence the overall distribution of wealth do not look particularly 
strong since, in the short and medium terms, even a large asset-based welfare policy 
seems unlikely to have more than a very small effect. A policy targeted at young adults is 
likely to lead to a more equal distribution of wealth among that group and will certainly 
reduce the number in this group with no financial assets. This could help increase 
intergenerational mobility. However, a more cost-effective way of achieving this aim 
could be through increases in education spending focused on lower-income groups. 
Arguments based on individuals’ opportunities to invest in education also suggest that 
reforms to education policy, such as maintenance payments for individuals from low-
income backgrounds, would be better targeted. Further research on any independent 
effects of holding savings and assets, in particular looking at precisely the mechanism 
that causes any improvements in ‘life chances’, is necessary to establish whether any 
particular form of asset-based welfare can be justified on these grounds. 
More convincing rationales for an asset-based approach to welfare appear to be those 
based on individuals holding ‘insufficient’ savings, especially if the ‘insufficient’ saving 
occurs because of a lack of information about financial institutions and the benefits of 
saving or because individuals are finding it difficult to get out of a habit of consuming all 
of their current income. In particular, this points to the importance of providing high-
quality, accessible financial information. Further research on whether it is the case that 
financial education is most effective when individuals currently hold a financial asset, and 
on which types of financial education work best, would be extremely useful. With these 
points in mind, we now turn to analyse the specific proposals that the government has 
put forward. 16 
4.  The government’s proposals 
The government’s proposals for asset-based welfare involve the creation of two new 
savings instruments: a Saving Gateway12 and a Child Trust Fund. These were discussed 
in an initial consultation document (HM Treasury, 2001a) and assumed the status of 
policy promises in Labour’s general election manifesto (Labour Party, 2001). The precise 
form of these instruments remains to be decided at the end of the consultation process. 
In this chapter, we treat these two proposed types of account in turn and discuss what 
we know about the form that they will take and what remains to be decided. We also 
comment on the likely costs to the exchequer of introducing the accounts. 
4.1  A Saving Gateway 
This will be a new type of savings account and will almost certainly be available only to 
those with lower incomes. Those who are eligible will be given strong incentives to place 
some of their current income or assets into an account. As with Individual Development 
Accounts (IDAs) in the USA, the incentive to save in the account will be provided by the 
fact that – up to some maximum amount – an account holder’s contributions ‘will be 
matched by the government’ (Labour Party, 2001, p. 10). There are many features of the 
Saving Gateway that remain unspecified:  
•  What will the eligibility criteria for the accounts be? 
•  Given that the Saving Gateway is to be targeted at those on lower incomes, will this 
involve family or individual income? 
•  Will changes in circumstances be taken into account when deciding on eligibility, 
and, if so, how?  
•  At what rate will matching occur?  
•  Should there be a minimum duration for which accounts must be kept open before 
the matching funds become available to the saver? 
•  What should the maximum duration (or ‘gateway period’) for the accounts be? 
•  Will savers be allowed to open second and subsequent accounts if they continue to 
satisfy the income criteria for eligibility after closing a first account?  
•  What financial assets should individuals be allowed to hold in their Saving Gateway? 
•  Will savers be allowed access to their funds during the gateway period, and will the 
access rules be different for own contributions and matching contributions?  
•  What will be the method for delivering financial education in conjunction with the 
Saving Gateway? 
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The ‘illustrative examples’ discussed in the final chapter of Savings and Assets for All (HM 
Treasury, 2001a) give us some further hints about the precise form that the Saving 
Gateway might take. They are calculated assuming that: eligibility will be determined 
according to some income test; the accounts will run for three years; contributions will 
be matched on a pound-for-pound basis up to a maximum of £50 per month. A scheme 
with these parameters would allow an individual to accumulate a maximum of £100 of 
assets (£50 from own contributions and £50 of matching funds) per month for 36 
months, thus yielding potential contributions worth £3,600. The figures discussed in 
Section 3.1 indicate that this total is significantly greater than the total financial wealth 
holdings of the majority of people in the UK population.  
Even assuming that the ‘illustrative examples’ accurately describe how the Saving 
Gateway will operate, it is still very difficult to cost the policy with any precision. This is 
partly because we have not been provided with any precise details about who the target 
group for the policy will be: we do not know what income groups will be eligible nor 
whether there will be criteria for eligibility other than an income test.  
Even if we did know how the policy would be targeted, it would still be difficult to cost 
the policy because the amount that the exchequer will pay in matching contributions 
depends on how much individuals will choose to save in their accounts. Previous 
experience illustrates how difficult it is to predict how households will respond to saving 
incentives: when personal pensions were introduced in 1988, the reform package 
included significant financial incentives to individuals to encourage take-up, and the 
Department of Social Security underestimated the number of people who would opt into 
such schemes by a factor of eight (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992, p. 4). The difficulty of 
predicting behavioural responses is likely to be increased in this case by the fact that the 
Saving Gateway is aimed at lower-income families, many of whom have little experience 
of saving.  
Our imprecise knowledge of how the Saving Gateway will be targeted also makes it 
difficult to assess the distributional effects of the policy, and again the difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that the impact of the policy depends on the behavioural 
responses of households. We would expect that, of those who are eligible for the 
scheme, it will be those with the highest current incomes and the lowest current 
consumption needs who will be the most likely to save. In a speech on the topic of asset-
based welfare, Martin Barnes, the Director of the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG), 
emphasised the fact that some of the policies proposed would not help the very poorest 
members of society if they cannot afford to save.13 In a recent article, Dobson (2001) 
makes a similar point and cites some evidence (drawn from Collard, Kempson and 
Whyley (2001)) from a Bristol-based survey that supports the view that those at the very 
bottom of the income distribution find it difficult to find money to save. This explains 
why the Saving Gateway cannot be regarded as a replacement for traditional income-
based policies aimed at supporting those on the lowest incomes. The government does 
not view its asset-based welfare policies in this way but sees them as a new and 
‘complementary, strand’ (HM Treasury, 2001a) in welfare policy. Since the Saving 
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Gateway will be means-tested, its impact will largely be felt by families near the bottom 
of the income distribution, although not by those at the very bottom of the distribution, 
for the reasons discussed in this paragraph.  
We will discuss how individuals might respond to the incentives provided by matching in 
Section 5.1. Then, in Section 5.2, we discuss how the Saving Gateway might be targeted. 
Since the strength of the response to incentives and the precision of targeting will 
dramatically affect how much the exchequer will have to pay in matching contributions, 
we postpone a further consideration of the cost of the Saving Gateway until after these 
two sections. Even after considering possible behavioural responses and methods of 
targeting, we are not able to assess the impact of the policy precisely enough to give any 
more detailed distributional analysis than the discussion of this section.  
4.2  A Child Trust Fund 
This will be a savings account opened at birth for all children. The account will be 
opened when the government pays an initial contribution (this element of the policy 
explains why it has become popularly known as the ‘baby bond’). The size of this initial 
contribution will depend on a means test, but all children will receive something. This 
feature of giving some help to everyone but most help to the least-well-off is described 
by the government as ‘progressive universalism’. The assets held in the account will 
become available to the child when he or she reaches early adulthood, possibly at age 18. 
Family and friends will be given incentives to make supplementary contributions to the 
account before the asset is passed to the young adult. As with the Saving Gateway, many 
features of the scheme remain unspecified: 
•  How generous will the initial payment be?  
•  Will it be supplemented by further state contributions later in the child’s life?  
•  What form will incentives for individuals to make additional contributions into the 
account take? 
•  How active a role should families and/or children have in deciding how the funds 
are invested?  
•  What is the best way to build financial education into the scheme?  
•  At what age will children get access to the funds, and will there be any restrictions 
controlling how the funds can be spent? 
The ‘illustrative examples’ in Savings and Assets for All (HM Treasury, 2001a) envisage a 
scheme that would pay an initial contribution of £500 to the poorest families, with 
further contributions of £100 when the child reaches ages 5, 11 and 16. Richer 
households would get half these amounts. Assuming that the funds accumulated at a 5 19 
per cent real interest rate, the maximum state contributions would be worth 
approximately £1,640 when the child reached the age of 18.14  
Since the decision to have a child is much less likely to be affected by policy than the 
decision of whether or not to save, it is much easier to provide an approximate costing 
for the Child Trust Fund than it is for the Saving Gateway. Assuming that the scheme is 
set up in such a way that half the recipients will receive £500 and half will receive £250, 
and that children who have already been born will not be eligible for the age-triggered 
payments, the policy would cost approximately £300 million in its first year. Paying the 
£100 and £50 supplements to all 5-, 11- and 16-year-olds (and again assuming that half 
of the population qualify for each amount) would add approximately £180 million to this 
cost.15 
As with the Saving Gateway, it is difficult to assess the distributional impact of the Child 
Trust Fund, but for different reasons. With the Child Trust Fund, the amount that the 
government contributes to each account (ignoring the possibility of matching of 
supplementary private contributions) will be determined by the means test and will not 
depend on the behavioural response of the account holder. This means that it is possible 
to say where in the income distribution the families receiving the help will lie at the time 
that the contributions are paid. Who actually benefits from the introduction of the Child 
Trust Fund is unclear since the funds have to be locked away for several years, until the 
child reaches young adulthood. Those families who would have put some money away 
for their child at birth will, if they want, be able to benefit immediately, since they could 
adjust downwards the amount that they give to their child. Unless they can borrow 
against it, families who would not have put any money away for their child will not 
benefit until the fund matures. For these reasons, we do not attempt to assess the 
distributional impact of the policy here. We return to some of these issues in Section 5.4, 
which discusses whether or not a means test based on current income will facilitate 
accurate targeting of this policy. 
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5.  Design issues in the government’s proposals 
There are a number of details in the design of both the Child Trust Fund and the Saving 
Gateway that are raised by the initial consultation document (HM Treasury, 2001a). This 
chapter goes through some of these issues and raises several points that policy-makers 
need to consider. Subsequent consultation, as the precise form of the two proposals 
becomes clearer, will also be extremely useful to ensure that the benefits of the policies 
are maximised while the costs and any undesirable incentives are kept to a minimum. 
5.1  Will individuals actually save more? 
One of the main motivations for the Child Trust Fund and the Saving Gateway is ‘to 
increase rates of savings and asset-ownership’ (HM Treasury, 2001a). Providing 
individuals with assets, as with the Child Trust Fund, is clearly going to increase the 
proportion of people holding assets. In contrast, it is not possible to state with certainty 
whether the Child Trust Fund or the Saving Gateway will lead to an increase, a reduction 
or no change in the rates of saving among the target groups. This is because of three 
different effects that the introduction of the policies would have: 
1.  The Child Trust Fund will provide individuals with an increase in their wealth which, 
if anything, will reduce the amount that they decide to save. This is because the 
increase in wealth means that higher future consumption can be achieved with lower 
current levels of saving. 
2.  The Saving Gateway, and possibly the Child Trust Fund, will allow individuals to 
receive a government match from any savings placed in the fund. This could increase 
or reduce the amount of saving that they undertake. This is because, although the 
benefit from an additional pound of saving will be higher, those who were already 
saving will find that they can achieve the same eventual stock of assets by making a 
smaller contribution themselves. 
3.  Both policies may come alongside financial education. Again, theoretically, this could 
reduce or increase the amount of saving that individuals choose to do. If individuals 
are not saving sufficient amounts, then, as argued in Section 3.3, it is possible that an 
asset-based policy such as the Saving Gateway will make them re-evaluate their 
consumption decisions and decide to save more. As discussed in Section 3.2, there is 
empirical evidence from the USA suggesting that certain types of financial education 
increase saving rates. 
The effect of any government match to individual savings will be extremely important in 
determining whether the two policies increase or reduce overall saving. We now look at 
this in more detail. 
The effect of the matched savings 
While the Treasury consultation document left open for consultation whether the 
government will match individual savings and, if so, what the appropriate level of 
matching is, the Prime Minister has stated that, with respect to the Saving Gateway, ‘the 21 
Government will match savings – pound for pound’.16 Any contribution from the 
government has the effect of increasing the annual return from each pound invested. 
The additional annual return received will depend on the rate at which the government 
decides to match and the minimum period that the recipient must wait before being able 
to spend the fund. Table 5.1 shows the rate of return provided by the government 
contribution, assuming that the funds are invested for various periods of time in an 
account paying a guaranteed zero real rate of return. A government match of 1:1 
invested for a minimum period of three years is equivalent to an annual rate of return of 
26.0 per cent. Even if the funds have to be held for 18 years, as in the case of the Child 
Trust Fund, then the annual rate of return is still a guaranteed 3.9 per cent. Higher 
matching rates offer much larger rates of return – with a return of 100 per cent a year 
being guaranteed if the match rate is set at 7:1 and the minimum holding period is three 
years. This very generous match rate of 7:1 is the highest available in Individual 
Development Accounts in the USA (Schreiner et al., 2001). It is clear from Table 5.1 that 
match rates of 0.5:1 still imply large real rates of return on any contributions made. 
Table 5.1. What is the implicit rate of return on saving being offered? 
Annual return arising solely from government contribution 
if minimum holding period: 
Government 
contribution per £1 
invested upon opening a 
Saving Gateway account 
1 year  3 years  5 years  18 years 
£0.00  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
£0.25  25.0  7.7 4.6 1.2 
£0.50 50.0  14.5  8.4  2.3 
£0.75  75.0 20.5 11.8  3.2 
£1.00 100.0  26.0  14.9  3.9 
£1.50 150.0  35.7  20.1  5.2 
£3.00 300.0  58.7  32.0  8.0 
£5.00  500.0  81.7 43.1 10.5 
£7.00 700.0  100.0  51.6  12.2 
Note: Assumes that a zero real rate of return is received on the investment. 
 
Given the implicit rates of return shown in Table 5.1, it is also possible that individuals 
will decide to borrow money, perhaps from a relative, in order to benefit in full from the 
match. This could substantially increase the cost to the exchequer of providing matched 
contributions. This is a potentially significant problem with offering matched savings that 
should be addressed by the government. It might be possible to reduce it by defining the 
maximum amount of matching that an individual can qualify for over a relatively short 
time span. For example, having a maximum amount of £50 per month rather than £600 
per year would reduce, but certainly not remove, the possibilities for individuals to 
borrow money in order to receive matched contributions on their ‘savings’. A monthly, 
rather than an annual, limit may also be more appropriate in trying to get individuals into 
a ‘saving habit’, as discussed in Section 3.2. 
Those individuals who are eligible for matched contributions who have some existing 
savings might well decide to move these savings so they can receive the government’s 
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contribution. This will mean that at least some of the money that attracts a government 
match will not be new savings.17 If the government opts for a lower match rate or sets 
the maximum match that an individual can receive at a relatively low amount, it will 
reduce these deadweight costs. However, if the scheme is not very generous, it might be 
insufficient to attract any new savings, and in particular it may be insufficient to persuade 
people to participate in potentially beneficial financial education. There is evidence from 
the USA that matched savings do work in getting people who had not previously saved 
to save. This research also suggests that more generous match rates reduce  overall 
aggregate saving, since some individuals choose to reduce the amount that they save 
(Schreiner, 2001).18 When choosing the appropriate match rate, the government will have 
to decide between trying to maximise the number of people who save anything and 
trying to maximise aggregate saving among the target group. The number of participants 
will be increased by offering sufficient match to entice people into the programme, while 
the US evidence suggests that maximising aggregate saving might be achieved by a lower 
match rate. 
5.2  How should the means test for the Saving Gateway be designed? 
The Saving Gateway will be ‘targeted specifically at lower-income households’ (HM 
Treasury, 2001a, para. 5.18). To achieve this targeting, it will be necessary to employ a 
means test. The initial assessment of income will take place just before the account is 
opened and will establish eligibility for some period. It must be decided whether or not 
income should be reassessed in order to allow eligibility to be terminated if recipients’ 
circumstances change significantly.  
It is interesting to consider whether or not an assessment of income when the account is 
opened will provide an accurate way of targeting the accounts towards individuals who 
have lower incomes throughout the period for which the account is held (the ‘gateway 
period’). We examine whether or not people who satisfy an income criterion at the 
beginning of a three-year period tend to be living still in lower-income households by the 
end of the period. If significant numbers are seen to experience large increases in income 
during a three-year period, then this would increase the motivation for reassessing 
income as a means of targeting the Saving Gateway accurately. 
The aims of the Saving Gateway go beyond that of simple redistribution. The policy is 
intended to ensure that ‘the benefits of building up financial assets can be extended to 
lower-income families’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, para. 1.7) who do not currently realise 
these benefits because they save very little or nothing. The policy might be considered to 
be badly targeted if it covers a significant number of individuals who are already aware of 
the benefits of holding financial assets and who hold a stock of savings. The policy could 
become very costly if such individuals were included and could receive large amounts of 
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increase in the amount of money held in the accounts. This does not necessarily represent an increase in aggregate 
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matching funds simply by transferring existing resources into the new accounts. This cost 
would come without achieving the goals of creating new saving and savers and teaching 
people about financial assets.  
As well as catching individuals who already save, a simple income test for eligibility might 
also result in Saving Gateway accounts being given to individuals who actually have good 
reasons not to be saving. In Section 3.2, we argued that pensioners currently receiving 
the minimum income guarantee would probably be unwise to save from their low but 
stable incomes. Pensioners more generally are not an obvious target group for saving 
incentives. We would typically expect those who have retired to be funding current 
consumption from income generated by assets accumulated during their working lives, 
and possibly also by running down these assets. Other low-income groups would be ill 
advised to be saving because their income is only temporarily low. Students are a good 
example of a group that can expect higher incomes in the future, and they will often wish 
to borrow against this expected income in order to fund current consumption. It would 
be an odd blend of policies that encouraged students to save whilst providing some 
support to them via a system of loans. One reason why those on lower incomes might 
want to save is to cover rainy-day contingencies when needs are very high relative to 
current income. For many amongst the unemployed, today is their rainy day and so this 
is another group for whom saving might be ill advised. 
In this section, we will examine data in an attempt to assess whether or not a simple 
income-based criterion for eligibility would result in many people who are already saving, 
or who we think might have good reasons for not saving, being eligible for the Saving 
Gateway. If it does, then this might suggest that there should be other criteria for 
eligibility alongside that of current income. Before moving on to this analysis, we will 
consider how successful a test based on current income would be in catching people who 
remain on low incomes throughout the duration of an account.  
Would families remain on lower incomes for the duration of a Saving Gateway account? 
We consider how many people who have low income in a particular year remain on low 
income for a three-year period. Three years is the duration suggested for a Saving 
Gateway in the ‘illustrative examples’ in Savings and Assets for All (HM Treasury, 2001a). 
Jarvis and Jenkins (1997) find that, in data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) for the years 1991 to 1994, there is evidence of considerable movement upwards 
from the bottom of the income distribution. They find that, of the people in households 
that had less than half mean income in the first year of the sample, only 52 per cent also 
had income below this level in 1992. About a third (34 per cent) had income below half 
wave-one mean income for each of the first three years of the sample and about one-
quarter had income below this level in all four years of the data. The data displayed in 
Table 5.2 are also taken from the BHPS, but for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997.19 The 
first column of the data displays a series of statistics for all individuals who have wealth 
data in 1995 and income data in all three years. The second column displays the same 
statistics for the poorest 22 per cent of individuals in this sample in 1995, which is to say 
those individuals who lived in households with incomes, adjusted for family size, of less 
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than £10,000 (in current prices) in 1995. The final column displays statistics for the next 
poorest 12 per cent, whose adjusted household incomes were between £10,000 and 
£12,000 in 1995. Columns two and three together account for approximately the poorest 
third of the 1995 sample. 
Table 5.2. Characteristics of different groups 
  All  Those with 1995 income: 
   Under 
£10,000  
£10,000 to 
£11,999  
% with income below £10,000 in 1995  21.8%  100%  0% 
% with income between £10,000 and £12,000 in 1995  11.9%  0%  100% 
      
% with income below £10,000 in 1995, 1996 and 1997  11.0%  50.8%  0.0% 
% with income below £12,000 in 1995, 1996 and 1997  20.4%  70.3%  42.8% 
      
% with income below £10,000 in 1995, 1996 or 1997  31.2%  100.0%  34.0% 
% with income below £12,000 in 1995, 1996 or 1997  43.4%  100.0%  100.0% 
      
Number of observations  6,689  1,456  796 
Notes: Income in approximate January 2002 prices and adjusted for family size using the McClements 
equivalence scale. Sample only includes individuals who provided income information in 1995, 1996 and 
1997 of the survey. 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1995–97; authors’ calculations. 
 
These data show that, amongst those living in households with income of less than 
£10,000 in 1995, slightly more than half had income of less than this amount in all three 
years of the sample and a further 20 per cent had income of less than £12,000 for all 
three years. Amongst those with income of between £10,000 and £12,000 in 1995, 43 
per cent remained below the upper bound in all three years. These figures indicate that, if 
the Saving Gateway is targeted on the basis of a means test administered at the beginning 
of the gateway period, then a substantial proportion of recipients would have incomes 
above the eligibility threshold before their accounts are closed. This need not be too 
serious a problem if most of those whose incomes rise only move a little way up the 
income distribution and/or if they are likely to fall back into low income in the future: 
such individuals might still benefit in the way intended from the saving incentives that 
are provided. On the other hand, amongst those who choose to save in Saving Gateway 
accounts, the proportion who remain on low income throughout the time that their 
account is open may be lower than our data suggest, for at least two reasons. First, 
households that currently meet the income criteria but expect a boost to their income in 
the near future are perhaps the most likely of the potentially eligible group to feel that 
they will be able to afford to save and so the most likely to take out an account. 
Secondly, there would also be an incentive to reduce one’s income temporarily in order 
to become eligible for the assistance provided by a Saving Gateway.20 Individuals whose 
incomes become large during the gateway period could be disqualified from saving in 
Saving Gateway accounts if incomes are periodically reassessed. However, extra means-
testing would increase the complexity and administrative costs of the policy and would 
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create a complex set of incentives to have low income during periods when income is 
being assessed. It might be decided that these costs are too large to be worth incurring. 
Are lower-income families failing to hold financial assets without good reasons? 
We argued above that a well-targeted Saving Gateway would not go to many individuals 
who already hold some assets. The data displayed in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b allow us to 
examine whether or not a means test based solely on income would be a good way of 
targeting the Saving Gateway towards people who have little or no asset holdings. The 
data used are the wealth data from the 1995 wave of the BHPS. We see that, amongst 
households with heads of all ages (Figure 5.1a), 45 per cent of the poorest 10 per cent of 
the sample have more than £500 in financial assets and 40 per cent have more than 
£1,000. Amongst the poorest 30 per cent of the population, almost half have assets 
exceeding £500 in value. This shows that low current income is far from being a perfect 
indicator of having low levels of savings. 
Figure 5.1b excludes over-60s from the sample. Since the elderly tend to be over-
represented near the bottom of the income distribution, but also tend to have some 
wealth, this reduces the proportion of people near the bottom of the income distribution 
who have some assets. We see that 80 per cent of people in the bottom 10 per cent of 
the income distribution for under-60s have less than £1,000 in assets. However, the 
proportions with assets do get somewhat higher as we move into deciles 2 and 3, where 
we would expect to find households that are more likely to be able to afford to save in a 
Saving Gateway. Across the bottom 30 per cent of the distribution, more than a quarter 
of individuals have financial wealth worth more than £1,000 and almost a third have 
financial wealth worth more than £500. These data suggest that the benefits of saving are 
already realised by a substantial proportion of low-income households. The fact that the 
data show that the proportions of people saving, and saving large amounts, increase with 
income is not surprising: this is precisely what we would expect in a population of 
individuals who were all making sensible saving decisions. 
Nonetheless, there remain a large number of people from low-income households who 
also have little or no asset holdings. Table 5.3 displays some further data on the 
characteristics of individuals in the same sample of BHPS data that was used for Table 
5.2. Again, the data are split into income bands so that the first column of the table 
displays data for all individuals in the sample, the second column contains statistics on 
the poorest 22 per cent of the sample and the final column contains statistics on the next 
poorest 12 per cent. We see that, amongst the poorest of these groups, only 31.5 per cent 
had savings exceeding £500 in 1995. Amongst those with incomes between £10,000 and 
£12,000, 36.1 per cent had more than £500 in savings. In other words, in the poorest 
third of the income distribution in this sample, around two-thirds of individuals did not 
live in families with savings exceeding £500 in value in 1995. 
The table allows us to see whether or not these people with low incomes and asset stocks 
are pensioners, students or unemployed. In the above, we identified pensioners, students 
and the unemployed as groups of people that contain individuals who often have good 
reasons for not saving. Amongst those with income below £10,000 in 1995, 41.3 per cent  
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Figure 5.1a. Estimates of household wealth, by income decile, 1995: 
all individuals 
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Figure 5.1b. Estimates of household wealth, by income decile, 1995: 
individuals in households with a head of household aged under 60 only 
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Notes: Wealth is total household wealth in interest-bearing accounts, savings and investments in 1995 prices. 
Income deciles (weighted) are computed from annual net household income using all households in the 
sample for Figure 5.1a but only households with a head aged under 60 for Figure 5.1b. Calculations are 
weighted using cross-sectional household weights. 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1995; authors’ calculations. 27 
Table 5.3. Characteristics of different groups 
    Those with equivalised 
income in 1995 of: 
 All  Under 
£10,000  
£10,000–
£11,999  
% aged 16–29  23.1  25.3  20.4 
% aged 30–39  22.1  17.9  21.0 
% aged 40–49  17.7  12.4  16.2 
% aged 50–59  13.3   7.5  10.6 
% aged 60–69  11.1  12.8  13.9 
% aged 70 or over  12.7  24.2  18.0 
      
All individuals      
% with no savingsa in 1995  25.3  41.9  36.7 
% with more than £500 in savingsa in 1995  48.4  31.5  36.1 
% living in owner-occupied housing in 1995, 1996 or 1997  76.8  49.2  67.7 
% with an occupational pension in 1995, 1996 or 1997  31.8  7.5  20.0 
% with a personal pension in 1995, 1996 or 1997  21.8  9.1  15.3 
As above but also making additional contributions in 
1995, 1996 or 1997 
13.5 4.7  8.8 
      
% who are in full-time education  9.3  19.2  12.3 
% who are unemployed  4.1  8.8  4.6 
% who are retired  19.0  30.7  26.6 
% not in full-time education, unemployed or retired  67.6  41.3  56.4 
As above but also with less than £500 in savingsa 35.6  30.8  40.6 
As above but also not in owner-occupied housing and 
with no private pension 
5.7 12.6  8.0 
      
Individuals aged under 60 only      
% with no savingsa in 1995  27.2  50.1  42.8 
% with more than £500 in savingsa in 1995  44.0  20.3  26.8 
% living in owner-occupied housing in 1995, 1996 or 1997  78.9  45.6  70.5 
% with an occupational pension in 1995, 1996 or 1997  40.9  11.8  28.6 
% with a personal pension in 1995, 1996 or 1997  27.8  13.4  22.0 
As above but also making additional contributions in 
1995, 1996 or 1997 
17.4 7.1  12.9 
      
% who are in full-time education  9.7  24.7  15.1 
% who are unemployed  5.0  13.2  5.7 
% who are retired  1.6  1.1  1.5 
% not in full-time education, unemployed or retired  83.7  61.0  77.7 
As above but also with less than £500 in savingsa 44.6  45.4  57.0 
As above but also not in owner-occupied housing and 
with no private pension 
6.8 18.0  11.1 
      
Number of observations  6,689  1,456  796 
a ‘Savings’ refers to any funds held in interest-bearing accounts or investments. Unlike in Figures 5.1a and 
5.1b, funds held in current accounts are not included. 
Notes: Income in approximate January 2002 prices. Savings measured in 1995 prices. Only includes 
individuals who provided income information in 1995, 1996 and 1997 of the survey. 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1995–97; authors’ calculations. 
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were neither students nor unemployed nor retired. If we also exclude those with savings 
exceeding £500, then we find that we are left with 30.8 per cent of our sample. We might 
also think that those who have chosen to hold a personal pension or who live in owner-
occupied housing will have some knowledge of financial institutions and so would not 
gain all the benefits that the Saving Gateway is intended to deliver. If we exclude those 
who have a private pension and/or who live in owner-occupied housing, as well as those 
with some savings and students, pensioners and the unemployed, then we find that only 
12.6  per cent of our low-income sample remain. This indicates that, if the Saving 
Gateway were targeted simply on the basis of income, then it might catch a lot of people 
who are already saving or who are sensible in choosing not to save. Whether or not we 
include those with private pensions and (in particular) those in owner-occupied housing 
has a large impact on the figures. An analysis of whether or not holding these assets 
provides the benefits that the government hopes will be provided by holding a Saving 
Gateway would be useful in informing a discussion of how many lower-income 
individuals would benefit from the new policy. 
We have argued above that pensioners are likely both to have some assets and to have 
good reasons for not being current savers. If we exclude the over-60s from our sample, 
then we see that the proportion of people with low income and who we think might be 
appropriate targets for a Saving Gateway does increase. In the lowest income bracket we 
consider, we see that 61  per cent of all under-60s are not students, unemployed or 
pensioners. Amongst those in households with income between £10,000 and £12,000, 
77.7 per cent do not fall into any of these three categories. Excluding anyone in one of 
these three groups and also those with over £500 in savings leaves us with 45.4 per cent 
of the lowest income band in our sample of under-60s and with 57 per cent of those with 
incomes between £10,000 and £12,000. If, on top of these exclusions, we also exclude 
those with private pensions or living in owner-occupied housing, then we again find a 
significant fall in the proportion of the sample that remains, to 18 per cent and 11.1 per 
cent respectively. These figures are again suggestive of the fact that targeting the Saving 
Gateway simply on low income amongst the under-60s could include many who do not 
need extra incentives to save or who have good reasons for not saving. Once again, the 
issue of whether home ownership and the knowledge of finances learnt when taking out 
a mortgage can bring the same benefits as the ownership and knowledge of financial 
assets will be important in determining how serious this problem is.  
What are the implications for the targeting of the Saving Gateway? 
What do these data suggest about how best to design a means test for the Saving 
Gateway? A first point to make is that our data use household income. This is not quite 
the same as the measure of combined income of adults in a family that will almost 
certainly be used as the unit of assessment for the means test: using this measure will be 
consistent with the method employed for all means tests introduced by Labour since 
1997.21 If joint assessment is used, then there is an issue as to whether couples will be 
eligible for one or two accounts. In a couple with only one account, one member of the 
couple might learn less about financial institutions and the habit of saving than if they 
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had their own account, which might incline us to think that an account per individual is 
the best system. The argument for individual accounts is strengthened by the fact that, if 
both individuals in a couple can have a Saving Gateway, then there is no complication 
about what happens if two people who both have accounts become a couple. Individual 
accounts would also mean that ownership of the asset should be easy to establish in the 
event of separation of a couple.  
Once the measure of income that will be taken has been decided, a decision must be 
made about the period over which it will be assessed. In the working families’ tax credit 
(WFTC), income is assessed over a six-week period in order to establish eligibility for six 
months. In income support, the assessment is based on weekly income. In the proposed 
integrated child credit (ICC) and employment tax credit (ETC), last year’s taxable income 
will be the main measure used. For the Saving Gateway, it would seem that the annual 
period of assessment might be the best option. This is because having such a long period 
of assessment would increase the cost to individuals of temporarily reducing their 
income in order to qualify for the Saving Gateway.  
If the measure of income taken were to be the same as that used in ETC and ICC, then 
eligibility for these benefits could be used as a means of ‘passporting’ people onto the 
Saving Gateway. This would be administratively simple because it would not require 
extra means tests to be created, and it would minimise the amount of extra form-filling 
that would be required of an individual wishing to apply for the Saving Gateway.  
A system of passporting could operate by automatically opening a Saving Gateway 
account for individuals as soon as eligibility for a benefit such as ETC is established. This 
would increase the cost of delaying an application for the Saving Gateway, because, in 
order to delay an application, one would have to forgo some current benefit income. 
There could be an incentive to delay an application for the Saving Gateway if individuals 
are only allowed to open one account during their lifetime. It might be deemed desirable 
to restrict individuals to one account, as the Saving Gateway is intended as a means to 
get people into saving but not as a long-term savings instrument.22 If individuals can only 
have one account, then they will want to open it at a time when they will be best able to 
save enough to maximise the amount of matching funds that they receive. The decision 
of when to open an account becomes a complex strategic choice. Automatic passporting 
from another benefit would mean that delaying the application would only be 
worthwhile for those who have low current benefit entitlement, and so it would have the 
advantage of simplifying the choice about when to apply for a once-in-a-lifetime Saving 
Gateway. On the other hand, such automatic passporting would have the drawback of 
meaning that some people would exhaust the gateway period at a time when they find it 
difficult to save.  
A system whereby eligibility was linked to ETC/ICC receipt would allow the Saving 
Gateway to be targeted relatively straightforwardly towards people from families in 
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saving, then it might be decided that those who have received a Child Trust Fund at birth will not stand to benefit fully 
from having a Saving Gateway and so ought to be excluded. 30 
which at least one adult is in work.23 This gets around the problem of including in the 
Saving Gateway the unemployed and those with the very low incomes provided by 
income support. 
Targeting on the basis of ETC/ICC eligibility would also exclude most pensioners. It 
would be possible to exclude all over-60s from the Saving Gateway and instead target 
help towards the low-income elderly by increasing the generosity of the minimum 
income guarantee / pension credit. It would also be easy to exclude the majority of those 
in full-time education from eligibility. Students are not eligible for many existing means-
tested benefits, such as housing benefit and income support. It would be possible not 
only to make students non-eligible, but also to restrict the policy to (say) over-21s or 
over-25s. This could reduce the cost of the policy but it might not be desirable. It may be 
that young adults are the people who have the most to gain from learning about financial 
institutions and forward planning so that they are well placed to take decisions that will 
affect their long-term futures. As we noted in Section 3.2, young adults are particularly 
likely not to hold any financial assets. 
One way of attempting to ensure that the aim of creating new savers and saving is 
fulfilled would be to disqualify those with more than a certain amount of assets from 
eligibility. We have seen that there are significant numbers of people who have low 
incomes but also have savings, who could transfer assets into a Saving Gateway account 
and receive matching funds without undertaking extra saving or learning anything new 
about financial institutions. However, there would be problems with administering an 
asset test. It would mean that eligibility for the scheme could not be simply linked to 
eligibility for benefits such as ETC or ICC: these new benefits will have no capital limits 
but will include interest income from savings in the means test. This means that 
introducing capital limits for the Saving Gateway could add to the administrative costs 
and complexity of the policy and would be inconsistent with the thrust of recent reforms. 
Additionally, the introduction of capital limits would create some odd behavioural 
incentives. People might find it worthwhile to spend a lump sum in order to run down 
their savings and qualify for matching funds, which could then be used to rebuild their 
savings. Such individuals would not be new savers. Even if capital limits did not induce 
people to spend away their assets, they could create incentives to pass assets to a trusted 
friend or family member or into a form that would make them more difficult to value for 
a capital test. Such behaviour might defy the letter of capital rules, but would be very 
difficult, and potentially costly, to police. 
So far, we have not discussed whether eligibility for a Saving Gateway would simply 
cease at some threshold level of income or whether it would be tapered away. Tapering 
could be achieved either by gradually reducing the rate at which contributions are 
matched or by gradually reducing the maximum amount of matching funds that 
individuals are entitled to, as income increases. The disadvantage of not tapering 
eligibility is that it would create an effective tax rate of well over 100 per cent on the 
pound of income that would take a family that saved over the maximum eligible income 
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level. Such a family would have an incentive to manipulate their labour supply in order to 
keep income below the threshold. During the last parliament, the government reformed 
the National Insurance system in order to get rid of one such extremely high marginal tax 
rate. It could therefore be seen to be consistent to have a taper on the Saving Gateway. 
On the other hand, the costs of such high tax rates due to the Saving Gateway might be 
lower than the cost of having them due to the design of National Insurance. With the 
Saving Gateway, the problem would only affect those individuals who are precisely at the 
income threshold and who satisfy any other criteria for eligibility and would like to save. 
If the Saving Gateway is designed in such a way that individuals can only open one 
account per lifetime, and if eligibility is established by a one-off means test, then, at any 
point in time, there will only be a relatively small number of people affected by the tax 
rates implicit in the means test for the account. For these reasons, a simple eligibility 
threshold for the Saving Gateway would be unlikely to create spikes in the wage 
distribution, with large numbers of people earning just below the threshold, in the way 
that the National Insurance system did. 
A simple cut-off would also have the advantage of making the Saving Gateway simpler 
and cheaper to administer via private financial service providers than if a tapered system 
were adopted. With a cut-off, knowledge that a Saving Gateway account was active 
would give the provider immediate knowledge of how much matching to provide for 
each pound of own contributions and of the total amount of matching per month that 
any individual was entitled to. This would make it easy for providers to credit matching 
contributions to accounts and then bill the government. With a tapered system, the 
provider would need detailed information of each individual’s eligibility before the 
correct amounts of matching funds could be credited to accounts. 
Some of the arguments presented in this section suggest that combining the means test 
for the Saving Gateway with the test for another benefit, such as ETC/ICC, would be a 
good idea. It would make for lower administrative costs and hassle to claimants than 
would the operation of separate means tests. The long period of assessment for 
ETC/ICC would also seem appropriate for the Saving Gateway, and attaching eligibility 
to eligibility for these benefits would mean that the Saving Gateway could be targeted 
towards working households. A concern would be that the ETC/ICC means test would 
not allow the exclusion of households that already hold assets, but there are potentially 
large problems with operating any asset test, especially in a policy that is designed to 
increase the asset holdings of individuals. 
The evidence reviewed in this section indicates that simply having low income is not a 
good indicator that a family will have low asset holdings or other characteristics that 
might indicate that the family might benefit from incentives to save. Given that this is so, 
it might be a good idea to target the Saving Gateway initially much more tightly than 
simply to those families who satisfy the ETC/ICC income test. Newly eligible ETC 
recipients might be chosen, because this group will be predominantly made up of people 
who have just experienced a rise in their income on entering work. This change in 
circumstances might mean that these people would be wise to re-evaluate their 
consumption choices and, in many cases, to consider beginning to save. Such a small-
scale Saving Gateway could be viewed as a pilot policy. It could be evaluated in terms of 
how well it achieved such goals as creating new savers and savings and also in terms of 32 
whether or not the new asset holders experienced better outcomes than they might 
otherwise have expected. The small scale of the policy would mean that it could be 
scrapped without creating too many losers if it had not proved a success. If the 
evaluation were favourable, then the policy should be retained and possibly expanded to 
allow other groups to be eligible.  
5.3  How much might the Saving Gateway cost? 
Now that we have discussed what criteria might be used in order to establish eligibility 
for the Saving Gateway, it is possible to discuss how much the policy might cost under 
various different sets of rules. Table 5.4 lists a number of different estimated costings. 
The different restrictions considered make for large variation in numbers eligible, which 
means that the range of costings is large. 
The table describes four different possible populations of people eligible for the Saving 
Gateway and details four different potential costings for the policy for each of these four 
groups. This gives a total of 16 potential costings. In all cases, we assume that the Saving 
Gateway matches funds at a one-to-one rate and pays a maximum of £50 per month to 
each account holder. The four different figures for each group depend on different 
assumptions about how much each saves in their Saving Gateway accounts, which in 
turn affects the value of matching funds that they receive. The four costings correspond 
to the eligible group receiving 80, 60, 40 or 20 per cent of the total amount of matched 
funds available to them. The cost of 100 per cent receipt is not considered on the 
grounds that full take-up would be unlikely for this means-tested policy. 
For each of our four eligibility groups, the population of eligible working-age adults 
includes our best estimate of the number of adults in households that will be eligible to 
receive some employment tax credit in 2003. We chose ETC because eligibility for the 
Saving Gateway could be passported from eligibility for ETC. We assume that both 
adults in eligible couples would be able to have their own accounts, and express our 
eligible populations as projected numbers of adults in eligible families. In order to 
estimate the size of the eligible population, it is assumed that ETC is available to families 
with children that contain at least one adult working for more than 16 hours per week 
and that have income of not more than about £13,000 per year. Families without 
children must have at least one adult working for more than 30 hours per week and 
annual income of not more than about £9,000 for single people or about £13,000 for 
those in couples, and contain at least one adult aged over 25. For a detailed discussion of 
how ETC might be designed and what this will mean for the size and characteristics of 
the eligible population, see Brewer, Clark and Myck (2001). They estimate that 
approximately 1.7 million adults would be in families eligible for a benefit designed in 
this way. Our first set of costings assumes that only these individuals will be eligible for 
the Saving Gateway. Our second set of costings is based on a policy targeted in the same 
way except that the age limit for families without children is removed. We estimate that 
this would add approximately 600,000 adults to the eligible population. We consider 
adding these adults to the eligible population because it is not clear to us that excluding 
young adults from the Saving Gateway would be sensible. It should be noted that this set 
of rules would not allow for passporting directly from ETC eligibility if this benefit had 
an age restriction for families without children. The third set of costings that we report 33 
again excludes those families that we project would not qualify for ETC on the basis of 
the age restriction, but adds in the 5.5 million adults that the government estimates 
would be in households that would be eligible for the pension credit in 2003 
(Department of Social Security, 2000, conclusion, para. 3). It is slightly odd to include all 
those eligible for the pension credit when, amongst working households, we have 
excluded those adults from households with the very low income provided by income 
support.24 However, there is no obvious benefit, other than the pension credit, from 
which eligibility for pensioner households could be passported. The final set of costings 
that we report is for the largest of the four eligible groups, which includes those on the 
pension credit and relaxes the age restriction that we assumed would apply in ETC. 
Table 5.4 Costing the Saving Gateway when eligibility is linked to receipt of 
employment tax credit or pension credit 
Who is eligible?  Minimum 
age for 
families 
without 
children 
Number 
eligible 
(million) 
% of maximum 
that is saved 
Cost of policy 
in the first year 
(£ billion)  
20% 0.2 
40% 0.4 
60% 0.6 
Adults in households projected 
to be eligible for some ETC 
25 1.7 
80% 0.8 
        
20% 0.3 
40% 0.6 
60% 0.8 
Adults in households projected 
to be eligible for some ETC 
None 2.3 
80% 1.1 
        
20% 0.9 
40% 1.7 
60% 2.6 
Adults in households projected 
to be eligible for some ETC or 
pension credit 
25 7.2 
80% 3.5 
        
20% 0.9 
40% 1.9 
60% 2.8 
Adults in households projected 
to be eligible for some ETC or 
pension credit 
None 7.8 
80% 3.7 
Notes: Costs are rounded to the nearest hundred million pounds. Age limits apply on the basis of the age of 
the oldest person in the couple. Costing for 80 per cent of maximum saving is consistent with individuals 
saving full amounts and 80 per cent take-up. This take-up rate is high compared with those for other 
means-tested benefits.  
Sources: Estimated eligibility for ETC – Brewer, Clark and Myck (2001). Estimated eligibility for the pension 
credit – Department of Social Security (2000). 
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The range of costings in Table 5.4 is very large, varying from £200 million to £3.7 
billion. It should be noted that the cost of the policy might rise in its second and third 
years as new households become eligible for the accounts while existing accounts are still 
active. Over time, the cost of the policy would decline if individuals are only eligible for 
one Saving Gateway account, as some individuals in lower-income households would 
have exhausted their eligibility.  
There are two reasons why the range is so large. The first is that we do not have very 
precise information about who will be allowed to save in the Saving Gateway. The 
consultation document (HM Treasury, 2001a) does not suggest that the policy would be 
any more or less tightly targeted than any of the cases considered in Table 5.4. Our 
speculations above suggest that a pilot version of the policy could be somewhat more 
tightly targeted than any of the cases considered. Such a pilot scheme could be designed 
in a way that reduced the likely cost substantially. Once the government provides a more 
detailed description of how it will target the Saving Gateway, we will be able to provide a 
more accurate range of costings for the policy.  
Even if we had precise information about the targeting of the policy, it would still be 
very difficult to predict how much eligible households would choose to save in Saving 
Gateway accounts. Since this will determine how much matching will be paid to each 
account holder, it follows that it is difficult to estimate how much the exchequer will 
have to pay in matching contributions. This is the second reason why it is difficult to cost 
the policy. In Section 4.1, we discussed the difficulties that have been experienced in the 
past in predicting how individuals will respond to saving incentives, and referred in 
particular to the case of personal pensions. Our discussion in Section 5.1 highlighted the 
fact that we know little about how individuals who are not currently saving will respond 
to the particular incentives provided by matching.  
It will be possible to provide a more accurate range of costings for the Saving Gateway 
once the government has told us how the policy will be targeted, but the exact cost will 
not be known until after the policy has been enacted and the behavioural response to it 
has been observed. 
5.4  How well targeted is the Child Trust Fund? 
Standard means-tested welfare benefits are paid as income supplements to those who 
have the lowest current incomes. If low current income is a good indicator of need, then 
these policies may be considered to be a well-targeted way of redistributing towards 
current low-income families. They might also be successful as a means of providing the 
most help to those who have the lowest lifetime resources, since these will be precisely 
those families whose income is low in most periods of their lifetime. 
With the proposed Child Trust Fund, the issue is more complex. The size of the fund 
that a young adult receives will, in part, depend on their parents’ income when they were 
born. During this period, family circumstances may have changed considerably – the 
incomes of their parents may have changed, as may the number of adults living in the 
household. Some young people who receive a relatively large payment at age zero 
because their parents are on a low income will actually be in a high-income family when 
they reach adulthood. Possibly of more concern to the government is the fact that some 35 
young people will be in higher-income families when they are born but in a relatively 
low-income family when they reach adulthood. The extent to which individuals born into 
low-income families remain in a low-income family throughout their childhood will be 
important in determining how well targeted the progressive element of the Child Trust 
Fund is.  
Table 5.5. Relative incomes of mothers and mothers-to-be, 
by age of youngest child or number of years before birth 
Years to birth (–) / 
Age of youngest child 
Median income 
relative to sample 
Sample size 
–4 1.072  206 
–3 1.084  275 
–2 1.149  388 
–1 1.129  528 
0 0.954  1,530 
1 0.922  1,424 
2 0.941  1,188 
3 0.952  1,000 
4 1.001  892 
5 0.992  768 
6 1.030  725 
7 1.020  685 
8 1.050  673 
9 1.039  617 
10 1.036  561 
    
All 1.000  11,460 
Notes: Age of child refers to the age of the mother’s youngest natural, adopted or step child aged under 11. 
If there is no child under 11 in the household, the number in the first column of the table refers to the 
number of years before the youngest child is born. Sample includes only those observations of women who 
either have a child under 11 in the year of interview or will give birth to a child in the next four years. 
Income is the net annual income of the household and is equivalised using a simple equivalence scale of 1 
for the first adult, 0.7 for the second adult and 0.5 for any additional adults. Incomes are not equivalised 
for the number of children in the household. The table shows the median income for the relevant group 
relative to the median income for the sample in that year. 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1991–99; authors’ calculations. 
 
Data from all nine waves of the BHPS are used to look at how the incomes of mothers 
and mothers-to-be change over time. In order to look at the income dynamics of 
households before and after a child is born, we take as our sample only those women 
who either have a child aged under 11 at the time of interview or have a child at some 
point over the next four years.25 Table 5.5 shows the average (median) household income 
by the age of the youngest child, or the number of years before birth, relative to our 
sample. This household income is adjusted for the number of adults in the household 
but not for the number of children. It shows that, for example, the median income of 
those women two years before the birth of a child who do not have any other children 
aged under 11 is 14.9 per cent higher than the average for the sample. Among those with 
a youngest child aged 1, it is 92.2 per cent of the average. This is without any adjustment 
for increased consumption needs due to the fact that women categorised as being two 
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years before birth have no children aged under 11 in the household while those with a 
child aged 1 have at least one. 
While there are several factors affecting the incomes presented in Table 5.5, such as 
changes in ages and family composition, it is also clear that, among this group of women, 
average incomes are relatively lower when the youngest child is aged under 4. This is 
likely to be caused, in part, by the difficulty of working full time with a pre-school-age 
child in the household. The figures could be used to support arguments that we should 
redistribute more towards groups with younger children, since this is a time when family 
incomes appear to be relatively lower, although families might plan for this in advance 
and might also choose the number of children that they have. 
While it is clear from Table 5.5 that the incomes of families with children change over 
time, this does not show us the extent to which families that are on relatively lower 
incomes when the child is born are also on a relatively low income during the entire 
period of the child’s upbringing. An indication of this is shown in Table 5.6. Again using 
the BHPS, children are placed into an income quartile depending on their family income 
and family size at age 1, and this is compared with the income quartile that they are in 
when they are aged 5. If the ranking of these children did not change between ages 1 and 
5, then everyone would remain in the same quartile and the table would show 100 per 
cent in the cells on the leading diagonal, with zeros elsewhere. Alternatively, if the child’s 
family income adjusted for family size at age 5 were completely unrelated to that at age 1, 
then 25 per cent of individuals from each income quartile at age 1 would be in each 
quartile at age 5.  
Table 5.6. Income quartile of children aged 1 compared with 
income quartile when they reach 5 
    Quartile when child is 5   
    1 2 3 4  Total 
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58.2% 
 
24.8% 
 
13.3% 
 
3.6% 
 
100.0% 
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24.2% 
 
44.2% 
 
24.2% 
 
7.3% 
 
100.0% 
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12.1% 
 
24.8% 
 
40.0% 
 
23.0% 
 
100.0% 
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5.5% 
 
6.1% 
 
22.4% 
 
66.1% 
 
100.0% 
  Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   
Note: Number of observations = 660. 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1991–99; authors’ calculations. 
 
In fact, of those in the poorest income quartile at age 1, only 58.2 per cent were in the 
same income quartile at age 5, with 24.8 per cent moving up to quartile 2, 13.3 per cent 
moving up to quartile 3 and the remaining 3.6 per cent moving up to the richest quartile. 
Mobility was found to be slightly higher in the second and third quartiles, with less than 37 
50 per cent being in the same quartile at age 5 as they were at age 1. While lower levels of 
mobility were found among those who were in the richest income quartile at age 1, it is 
still the case that 11.6 per cent were in the bottom two quartiles at age 5 and a further 
22.4 per cent in quartile 3. These movements across the income distribution of young 
children could be due to either changes in family incomes or changes in family size or a 
combination of the two.  
This mobility is over just four years rather than the entire duration that the Child Trust 
Fund will be held, which implies that income when the child is born may not be a 
particularly good proxy for the child’s family income during their entire upbringing. This 
suggests that providing larger Child Trust Funds to young adults whose families were on 
low incomes at birth is not equivalent to providing larger Child Trust Funds to young 
adults whose families were on low incomes throughout their childhood. The government 
has suggested the possibility of making top-up payments, based on family income, into 
the child’s fund during their life – for example, at ages 5, 11 and 16. If the government 
does decide to make progressive payments into the Child Trust Fund, it will need to 
decide whether to take into account the incomes of absent parent(s) or that of any 
parent’s new partner living in the household. One problem with progressive top-up 
payments is that they might add to the administration costs of the government and the 
financial providers (Abbey National, 2001). However, these figures suggest that, if the 
government wants to provide a higher fund to those children from families that were 
relatively poor during their entire upbringing, then it should spread the payments over 
the child’s life. It might be sensible to make each payment of a relatively similar size, 
unless there is strong evidence that, for example, family income at birth is far more 
important than family income at other ages in explaining a person’s opportunities when 
they reach early adulthood.  
While introducing a means-tested element to the Child Trust Fund might not be 
particularly costly in terms of administration, since individuals could be passported from 
other benefits, it is not necessarily costless in terms of stigma. While parents may not 
have the cost of additional stigma from receiving additional passported benefits, there 
may be a cost in terms of stigma felt by the child. This could be particularly problematic 
if the government wants the Child Trust Fund to help children to learn about the 
advantages of saving and compound interest at school. 
In fact, given that, by the time they receive the fund, a young adult might be considered 
as being independent of their parent(s), it is not necessarily the case that making larger 
payments to people from low-income backgrounds achieves the best outcome. One 
viable alternative would be to base the means test on the circumstances of the young 
adult. If the government does want to redistribute more towards low-income families 
with children, then the integrated child credit looks like the obvious mechanism for 
delivering that aim. The strongest argument for redistributing towards young adults on 
the basis of family income during their childhood is that life opportunities are correlated 
with, but not caused by, this previous low family income. This would mean that young 
adults from low-income families did have fewer opportunities in life, but that increasing 
family income during their childhood would not have increased these opportunities. 
Even if this is the case, then it could still be true that a better alternative policy might be 
to focus greater educational resources on children from low-income families, since 38 
evidence suggests that education is the main mechanism through which individuals from 
low-income families can achieve better outcomes (Johnson and Reed, 1996). 
The evidence from the BHPS presented in this section shows that parents’ income at 
birth is not a particularly good indicator of parents’ income throughout childhood. Given 
that the government could carry out more redistribution to low-income families with 
children through the integrated child credit and that it could also focus more educational 
resources on children from low-income families, it is not at all obvious that the 
progressive element of the Child Trust Fund is the best way of targeting help to improve 
the ‘life chances’ of young adults from low-income families. 
5.5  What assets should people be able to hold in the Child Trust Fund and the 
Saving Gateway? 
The government is also consulting on which financial assets individuals should be able to 
hold in the Child Trust Fund and the Saving Gateway. The government could choose to 
limit the choice that individuals have to relatively safe investment options. This would 
reduce the amount of investment risk that these individuals hold but also reduce the 
expected returns from these assets. It is also possible that the gains people receive from 
financial education will depend on how much freedom they have to choose where to 
invest their funds. 
In addition to many other individual circumstances, the optimal investment strategy will 
also depend on how long the individual expects to be able to hold the investment for. 
With the Child Trust Fund, it seems likely that the initial contribution to the funds will 
not be spent for at least 18 years, which is a relatively long time horizon. Hence, it might 
seem appropriate to allow individuals to consider equity-based investments. If equity-
based investments are held, then individuals should consider moving away from riskier 
investments as the date at which they intend to spend the money approaches, as is the 
case with pension savings. It seems appropriate that the government ensures that 
individuals are informed about this. Otherwise, a downturn in equity prices occurring just 
before an individual with a Child Trust Fund is planning to spend the funds could leave 
them with lower amounts than they had hoped and an unwillingness to invest in equities 
in the future. 
The Saving Gateway is likely to have a much shorter minimum holding period before 
individuals can spend the government’s contribution. Furthermore, the target group for 
this policy is presumably those who have little or no savings. Hence, it is less clear that 
investing in equity-based products would be an appropriate investment strategy, and the 
government may decide that it is sensible to prevent individuals holding equity-based 
investments in the Saving Gateway. This is the view of the Association of Investment 
Trust Companies (2001), who argue that the Saving Gateway should be ‘restricted 
exclusively to cash-type investments’. This view is not shared by the Association of Unit 
Trusts and Investment Funds (2001), who state that ‘equity investment should be an 
option for the Saving Gateway’. Whether or not the government feels it should restrict 
the types of assets that individuals can hold will depend, in part, on the quality of 
financial information that it believes these people are likely to receive.  39 
5.6  Should there be restrictions on how the matured assets can be spent? 
In its consultation document, the government considers the possibility of ‘restricting the 
uses to which young adults can put the funds in their matured Child Trust Fund’ (HM 
Treasury, 2001a, para. 5.11). This is compared to the way that matching funds in 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) in the USA are made available only for 
expenditure on education or housing or to set up a small business. The government has 
not argued that funds held in a Saving Gateway should be restricted for certain uses, 
since it has stated that they should be ‘available on a rainy day’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, 
para. 5.28). 
One justification for restricting how matured funds in the Child Trust Fund can be spent 
would be that a major point of the policy is to subsidise and encourage participation in 
the favoured activities amongst the groups targeted for assistance. There may be good 
reasons for wanting to subsidise these activities if market failures mean that some 
individuals have their opportunities to pursue them unfairly restricted. Even if we think 
that there are such failures, then, as we argued in Section 3.2, there would be more direct 
means of tackling them than the proposed asset-based policies: means-tested grants for 
those in education, subsidised housing and subsidised business loans are policy tools that 
are available to the government.  
Furthermore, there is no mechanism to ensure that initial contributions to the Child 
Trust Fund, paid several years before the funds are spent, could be targeted towards 
those individuals likely to benefit the most from spending on the specified activities. 
Indeed, we may think that there are good reasons why those individuals most targeted by 
the policy are those who are least likely to gain from these types of spending. Although 
young adults from low-income backgrounds tend to be unlikely to stay on in education 
or to own their homes or to run their own businesses, there may be good reasons that do 
not reflect market failures for them choosing not to participate in these activities. They 
might well be individuals who choose not to invest in post-compulsory education 
because they would gain little from such education. Young adults who do not buy their 
homes may prefer to rent because this allows greater geographical mobility, which in turn 
allows them to pursue better-paid jobs away from their home town. The fact that young 
individuals find it difficult to borrow to fund new businesses may reflect the fact that 
they tend to make poor entrepreneurs, whilst the fact that poorer households are 
reluctant to undertake such debt may reflect the fact that they are risk-averse; in either 
case, low rates of business start-ups need not reflect a market failure that prevents 
households from getting access to funding.26 If it is the case that the youngsters who 
receive the most financial support through the Child Trust Fund also tend to be those 
with little to gain from the activities that would be designated as possible uses for the 
funds, then placing restrictions on how the funds can be used would be 
counterproductive because it would reduce the effective value of the funds to precisely 
those individuals on whom the government is targeting the most help. 
A further possibility is that the justification for restricting how the funds can be spent is a 
more paternalistic one depending on the fact that, without such restrictions, individuals 
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would not choose to spend the funds in the way that most benefits them, perhaps 
because they do not realise the size of the future benefits accruing from spending on the 
designated purposes. This would seem to be a slightly odd argument to use if part of the 
aim of the Child Trust Fund, and the reason for opening accounts when a child is born 
rather than simply providing a lump sum to all young adults, is to teach youngsters 
and/or their families the virtues of forward planning. The government has not spelt out 
why it thinks that the best design for a policy intended to ensure that ‘all young people 
should be able to embark on their adult lives with a financial asset to invest in their 
future’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, abstract) involves setting up accounts at birth. It is possible 
that the reason for doing this is to facilitate means-testing that takes into account family 
circumstances at the time of birth (Section 5.4 discussed whether or not it is a good idea 
for the Child Trust Fund to have a means test that measures circumstances at birth). 
However, it seems likely that the beliefs that holding assets can help youngsters and/or 
their families to learn about finances and about how to plan ahead are also important 
motivating factors. If these are indeed factors motivating this design feature, and if the 
range of choices for how funds can be spent is to be restricted, then the government 
would need to make clear why it feels that Child Trust Fund holders would not learn 
enough about forward planning that they (or society) would benefit more from having an 
unrestricted rather than a restricted choice.  
So far in this section, we have considered arguments for whether or not it might be a 
good idea to constrain how individuals can spend their mature Child Trust Funds. What 
we have not considered is whether or not it is practical to attempt to restrict how the 
funds are spent. If many of the individuals who receive the funds would have spent on 
the designated purposes in any case, then they would probably be able to adjust their 
finances to ensure that the money from the trust fund was spent in accordance with the 
regulations, without actually increasing their spending on the particular purpose chosen. 
Only if many of the individuals who benefit from the schemes would otherwise have 
spent little or nothing on the specified purposes will the policy be sure to create 
significant new spending on these things. Even then, it is possible that individuals could 
get immediate access to their funds unless there is strict policing of their behaviour. For 
example, they could purchase a property only to sell immediately, or they could set up 
their own small business and then liquidate it. 
5.7  Should individuals have access to their own contributions? 
The government is consulting about whether individuals should be able to have access, 
before accounts mature, to any contributions that they make to either a Child Trust Fund 
or a Saving Gateway. Along with the tax treatment and the presence of any government 
match, whether individuals have immediate access to any contributions that they make 
will also affect the incentives that they have to save in these accounts.  
The target group for the Saving Gateway is those on lower incomes who have little or no 
savings. As highlighted in the Treasury consultation document, these groups might be 
better off saving in a relatively liquid form for a ‘rainy day’ rather than in an illiquid form, 
such as a stakeholder pension. Hence, it may seem sensible to allow individuals who have 
made contributions to a Saving Gateway to have access to those funds before the 
Gateway matures. If this is allowed, the government will have to decide whether 41 
individuals who have withdrawn their contributions are still allowed to receive the 
matched funds when the gateway period comes to an end. If individuals are not allowed 
to retain the government match, then this will provide an incentive for those who suffer 
a ‘rainy day’ to borrow funds rather than to make withdrawals from their Saving 
Gateway. A more preferable outcome is likely to involve allowing these people to have 
immediate access to their own funds – particularly since it may help them to learn about 
the benefits of saving. 
The policy of allowing individuals to retain their government match would also not be 
without complication, because it is important that individuals do not have an incentive to 
withdraw and recontribute to their funds in order to receive additional matches without 
contributing any extra savings. In order to prevent individuals from getting multiple 
matches without actually building up a stock of their own contributions, further 
government matching should only be given when an individual has replaced all the funds 
withdrawn. This problem should not be insurmountable, but would place an additional 
administrative burden on the providers of the accounts. 
With the Child Trust Fund, there is a manifesto commitment to ‘provide incentives for 
extended family and friends to contribute’ (Labour Party, 2001, p. 27). One potential 
difficulty that the government will need to consider concerns the ownership of the 
contributions into a Child Trust Fund – for example, if ‘extended family and friends’ do 
place savings in the account, would it be desirable to allow the child’s parents to 
withdraw these funds? 
It is not clear, as yet, what the ‘incentives’ to individuals to contribute to a Child Trust 
Fund will be. The consultation document only mentions the possibility of using a ‘limited 
tax incentive based on the ISA model’ (HM Treasury, 2001a, para. 5.7). If this method 
for encouraging contributions is used, then a strategy of saving in an ISA offers the same 
tax relief and greater liquidity. Those who have already contributed up to the ISA limit in 
that year may be the only people for whom making contributions to a Child Trust Fund 
is a sensible strategy. These individuals are extremely likely to be drawn from the top end 
of the income distribution. Saving in a Child Trust Fund would be particularly attractive 
to those who have used their ISA limits if any tax relief were combined with immediate 
access to the funds. If the government decides to provide an incentive more generous 
than ISA-style tax treatment, then this would severely reduce the attractiveness of saving 
in an ISA for families with children. It would also undermine pensions policy by reducing 
the incentive for this group to save in any private pension, such as a stakeholder pension. 
This is one of many interactions between the two proposals and other government 
policies affecting saving decisions. We now turn to consider some more.  
5.8  How does this policy interact with other government policies? 
Since 1997, the Labour government has introduced a number of measures that are likely 
to influence individuals’ saving decisions. In particular, it has implemented what it 
described as ‘radical reform of the whole pension system’, with the stated objective of 
increasing the proportion of pension income that comes from private sources 
(Department of Social Security, 1998). The government has also stated that, among other 
things, ‘the right environment for saving involves a stable macroeconomy’ (HM 42 
Treasury, 2001a). While this may be true, it is also the case that a stable savings 
environment may improve saving decisions – in particular with respect to long-term 
savings such as those held for retirement (Tanner, 2000; Banks and Emmerson, 2000). 
Continuing policy reforms have meant that there has not been a stable savings 
environment. For example, those individuals who were in the government’s target group 
for stakeholder pensions – that is, those earning around £10,000 to £20,000 who had not 
yet made any private pension arrangement – could well be affected by two policies 
introduced after stakeholder pensions came into effect: the proposed pension credit and 
the Saving Gateway. Some of those who have decided to save in a stakeholder pension 
may now regret that decision, given that the introduction of the pension credit could 
mean that they face a 40 per cent withdrawal rate on income in retirement and given that 
they may become eligible for a Saving Gateway. The savings that they have tied up in 
their stakeholder scheme could instead have been used to place larger contributions into 
their Saving Gateway and hence entitle them to more matched savings from the 
government. They would also have greater liquidity, since funds in a Saving Gateway will 
not have to be tied up until retirement. 
This does not suggest that we should never reform the savings environment, but it does 
demonstrate that many policies interact and that new reforms often come at the cost of 
increased complexity. Empirical evidence on people in the stakeholder pension target 
group had already suggested that they might be more appropriate targets for an ISA 
(Disney, Emmerson and Tanner, 1999). Until further details on the Saving Gateway are 
announced, individuals who might be eligible to receive a Saving Gateway account 
should certainly consider holding their savings in a liquid form so that they could benefit 
fully from any government match.  
There are also a number of more specific issues relating to how the Child Trust Fund 
and the Saving Gateway might operate compared with the CAT marking27 of ISAs and 
the structure of stakeholder pensions. Given that the consultation document contained 
very little detail on these issues, it would be sensible for these to be discussed more in 
subsequent consultation. It seems beneficial to allow individuals to switch funds between 
different providers with the minimum of cost, since this will maximise competition 
between providers for both new and existing accounts. It would also be consistent with 
the government’s approach to both stakeholder pensions and CAT-marked ISAs. If it 
allows equity-based investments to be held in either the Saving Gateway or the Child 
Trust Fund, the government will also have to decide whether to restrict the way that 
funds can charge and, if so, whether it sets a maximum level of charge. Restricting the 
way that charges can be levied seems a sensible idea, since it may help promote 
competition. In particular, only allowing charges that are a percentage of the fund would 
again be consistent with the approach taken to both stakeholder pensions and CAT-
marked ISAs and would enable individuals to make comparisons between the different 
products. Setting a maximum charge should not be necessary unless there are concerns 
about the extent to which competition can work in driving charges down.28 
                                                      
27 ‘CAT-marked’ is the government term for those financial products that meet a voluntary benchmark for Charges, 
Access and Terms. For more details, see Financial Services Authority (1999). 
28 For a discussion of these issues in the case of stakeholder pensions, see, for example, Emmerson and Tanner (1999). 43 
6. Conclusions 
This Commentary has looked at a number of issues arising from the government’s 
consultation document, Savings and Assets for All. We have considered a number of 
alternative possible justifications for the introduction of asset-based welfare in the UK. 
Many of the market failures that asset-based welfare might be intended to help to 
alleviate might be better tackled by other interventions. For example, if low-income 
individuals find it difficult to borrow to invest in education, then means-tested assistance 
with maintenance costs would be a better-targeted policy. 
The justification for asset-based policies need not rely on any particular market failure if 
it is the case that holding assets has an ‘independent effect’ on an individual’s life 
chances. Our view is that the existing evidence of such effects is not strong enough to 
justify a large-scale programme of asset-based welfare policies. Perhaps more convincing 
are arguments that engaging in the process of saving, and thereby learning to plan ahead 
and learning about financial institutions, can help people to improve the outcomes that 
they achieve. If this is the strongest justification, then financial education has a significant 
role to play in any asset-based policies that are enacted. 
The government has proposed two specific asset-based policies. One stated aim of the 
Child Trust Fund is to ensure that young adults are ‘able to embark on their adult lives 
with a financial asset to invest in their future’. The proposed policy does not provide 
assets to young adults directly, but instead makes payments to children at birth. This 
suggests that there are other policy objectives. These could include that the holding of an 
asset helps to teach children about how to make saving decisions and plan ahead, and a 
desire to focus additional funds on individuals born to low-income families. If these 
benefits exist, it is not obvious that they would be felt more strongly by newborns, upon 
whom the current policy proposal is focused, than by other young children. The 
government is also consulting on whether young adults should be constrained in the way 
that they can use their funds. Such constraints would be extremely difficult to regulate 
and, in any case, sit oddly with a policy aimed, in part, at improving an individual’s ability 
to plan ahead. Greater clarification of the aims of the Child Trust Fund and the reasons 
for the particular design features already suggested would make it easier for further 
consultation to be fully productive. 
The Saving Gateway would seem to have a slightly clearer purpose, which is to 
encourage new saving and savers amongst lower-income households. Our analysis 
indicates that the way in which this policy is targeted is likely to be crucially important in 
determining whether or not the policy can achieve its aims without also incurring large 
exchequer costs by subsidising individuals who would have saved without 
encouragement.  
A clearer statement of the precise aims of these two policies would be welcomed. This 
would assist the further consultation that will be necessary to determine the many 
outstanding details of the policies. 44 
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